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Abstract
Objectives This paper aims at covering a literature gap on
the effects of copayments, prescription quotas and thera-
peutic reference pricing on public and private expenditures
and volumes (1) When these policies are implemented in
different areas at different times, (2) estimating their
impact in the short and long run, (3) assessing the extent to
which these impacts are interdependent, (4) scrutinising the
extent to which the effects are mediated by prescribers’ and
patients’ behaviours.
Methods Monthly regional data on pharmaceutical
expenditures, volumes and policies in Italy from 2000 to
2014 are analysed using a difference-in-differences model
enriched to capture short- versus long-term effects and
simultaneous and interactive effects. Sobel–Goodman test
and bootstrap analyses were used to test for mediation.
Results The three policies have different short- and long-
run effects. Interactions support the hypothesis of rein-
forcing effects. Behavioural reactions to policies such as
reducing the demand or total per capita expenditures
mediate the impact of policies, thus explaining the different
effects between the short and long term.
Conclusions Evidence on the impact over time of regio-
nal policies diversely introduced in different times have
important policy implications. First, pharmaceutical poli-
cies interact with each other, and the combined effect may
be different from what we would expect from the sum of
each single policy. Hence, policymakers should be very
careful in designing mixed policies for their unexpected
combined effects. Second, the impact of policies tends to
reduce over time. If longer-term impact is desired, it would
be appropriate to introduce some adjustments over time.
Third, policies have multiple effects, and this should be
considered when they are designed. Finally, pharmaceuti-
cal policies may have an unintended impact on health and
health care.
Keywords Pharmaceutical policies  Patients’
perspective  Mediated effects  Impact evaluation
JEL Classification I1  H5  H75
Introduction
In the last 20 years, pharmaceutical policies have been
mostly driven by the cost-containment imperative. There-
fore, a primary research target has been the impact of
pharmaceutical policies on public expenditures [1–5], pri-
ces [3, 6, 7] and demand/quantities [4, 5, 8–12].
Literature on the impact of pharmaceutical policies has
some limitations. First, most studies focused either on a
single therapeutic class [8, 10–12] or on the effects of a
single policy [1, 3, 9]. Second, the simultaneous impact of
different policies [11] and their effects over time [2] have
not been investigated. Third, when more dependent vari-
ables (e.g. drug volumes and expenditures) were scruti-
nised [4, 5, 7], they were independently analysed. Thus,
despite evidence that pharmaceutical policies impact more
than one variable, little is known about how these effects
are interdependent, such as how much the reduction in
public expenditures is caused by a fall in the demand for
pharmaceuticals. The literature has investigated the effects
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of reference pricing [2, 7, 13, 14] and copayment [5, 11, 12,
15]. However, research has not considered regional policies
together with the combined effects of different policies
over time.
The aim of this paper is to fill these information gaps
using Italy as a case study. First, we evaluate the simul-
taneous and interactive effects of three pharmaceutical
policies on public and private retail drug spending and
quantities, both in the short and long term. The policies
include copayment, prescription quotas (i.e. binding pre-
scription targets per therapeutic class) and therapeutic
reference pricing (TRP) (i.e. using a reference price per
therapeutic class and having patients cover the difference
between prescription and reference price). Therapeutic
reference pricing is based on a cluster for price comparison
larger than in the most common reference pricing, which is
generally only applied to the same molecule or molecule–
package pair. Second, we tested a behavioural mediation
hypothesis to assess whether and how the impact of these
policies on public expenditures is related to (1) a change in
volume, holding private expenditures constant (and esti-
mating the effects of other mechanisms, such as pure price
effects) and (2) a shift from public to private coverage,
holding volumes constant.
Italy serves as an ideal case study, as a wide range of
pharmaceutical policies have been autonomously applied
by Italian regions. As a consequence, data are available on
‘‘treated’’ and ‘‘untreated’’ regions over different periods
and with different combinations. As highlighted by other
authors [5], Italy represents a natural experiment because
policies are implemented by regional governments after the
central government has approved drug marketing and
regulated prices and reimbursements. Nonetheless, the
impact of Italian regional policies on pharmaceutical
expenditures, with the exception of copayment [5], has not
been scrutinised. Previous studies have conducted
descriptive analyses of policies [16, 17] and pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure trends [4, 17, 18].
Background and hypotheses
Since 1992, pharmaceuticals have been a preferred target
of cost-containment actions [17]. Centralised price cutting,
discounts on list prices and drug delisting prevailed in the
first 10 years. Cost-containment approach was strengthened
with the introduction of a spending cap on drugs (set as a
percentage of public health funds) that was enforced by law
in 2001. Initially, general price cuts were applied to cover
the deficit. Since 2007, the industry has been partially in
charge of covering the deficit: each pharmaceutical com-
pany is given a budget based on the national drug budget
for the current year and market shares in the previous year;
if the actual drug spending is over the budget, each
company will contribute to the payback in proportion to its
actual revenue (compared with its budget). Reimbursement
and ex-factory prices are simultaneously negotiated by the
national drug agency and the relevant company. The main
criteria used in negotiation are disease burden, place in
therapy and availability of alternative treatments, risk–
benefit profile, therapeutic added value and impact on the
drug budget. For most new drugs, managed market (fi-
nancial-based and outcome-based) contracts are agreed on;
for some drugs, more than one contract is negotiated [19].
Finally, reference pricing for genericated molecules
(molecules with at least one generic version available) was
introduced nationwide in 2001 and applied to the same
molecule–package pair. TRP, instead, was introduced as a
policy option implementable by regional governments in
2006.
Despite price and reimbursement being managed at the
central level, since 2002, regions have implemented
diverse actions to face financial constraints. In fact,
regional governments have become accountable for their
health-care-spending deficits. As a consequence, they
strengthened their cost-containment actions on pharma-
ceuticals [17]. Copayment, actions on prescribing beha-
viour, including prescription quotas, and TRP were
introduced by various regions to curb the retail market,
whereas drugs used in hospital settings have been
affected by regional formularies and procurement policies
[4, 20].
Copayment in Italy is active in two forms: as a pre-
scription fee and as the spread on the reference price. The
latter has been active since 2001 (and then optionally
increased in level with TRP) and is more the effect of a
policy than a policy itself. Copayment as prescription fee,
instead, was first introduced by regional governments in
2002 and is the form considered in this study as ‘‘copay-
ment’’ policy; in 2014, drugs were subject to copayment in
16 ut of 21 regions. The introduction of copayment pro-
duces a payment shift from third-party payers to patients
and is expected to lower drug consumption, at least in the
short term. Therefore, we expect a short-term decline in
public expenditures and increase in private expenditures. In
absolute terms, private expenditures are expected to be
lower than public expenditures because of the drop in
consumption. In other words, we expect consumption to
mediate the effects of copayment on public expenditures.
In the long term, patients and prescribers may adjust their
initial choices and increase consumption, leading to a
positive impact on both public and private expenditures.
Prescription quotas were first introduced in 2005. They
refer to binding prescription targets that address general
practitioners prescribing more genericated molecules
within a certain therapeutic class (e.g. x Percentage of
genericated statins over the total prescription of statin).
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These quotas are usually enforced by (regional) law and
linked with sanctions/incentives for prescribers. For the
most important retail therapeutic classes [e.g. hypertension
drugs, statins, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) and proton pump inhibitors (PPIs)], quotas were
applied in 13 regions in 2014. Prescription quotas are
expected to shift prescriptions within a therapeutic class of
drugs from expensive to less expensive, with an overall
reduction in public expenditures. No effect is expected on
volume unless cheaper drugs lead to increased consump-
tion, and no effect is expected on private expenditures
unless generic products are associated with generic mole-
cules that involve copayment due to reference pricing. We
expect that prescription quotas require behavioural adjust-
ments by patients and prescribers, and we expect these
adjustments to occur over the long term.
TRP was intended to reduce the expected impact of
generic reference pricing, which enhances a prescription
shift from genericated molecules to patent-protected drugs
in the same therapeutic area, avoiding the application of
generic reference pricing. As of 2014, TRP was applied
only to PPIs in nine regions. In October 2007, around
1 year after its introduction, this policy option was abol-
ished at the regional level for equity reasons, but the new
regulation has not had any retroactive effect, such that
regions that had already activated TRP were allowed to
maintain it. In principle, TRP is expected to reduce public
and increase private expenditures. However, in the absence
of copayment and prescription quotas, TRP could have
adverse effects on public expenditures. In fact, TRP redu-
ces the perceived minimum price for both private and
public payers and could stimulate a higher demand.
Because the demand mechanism is behavioural, we expect
the effect to occur in the long term.
An interaction of policies is expected to occur to the
extent to which the mechanisms behind them are not
independent. Depending on how their mechanisms interact,
one policy can reinforce or hinder the effects of the other.
We expect that the three policies reinforce each other in
decreasing public expenditures. The simultaneous presence
of copayment and prescription quotas should lead pre-
scribers to reduce inappropriate prescriptions and to favour
cheaper drugs. Similarly, copayment associated with TRP
should orientate prescribing behaviour toward less expen-
sive molecules. Finally, prescription quotas should mitigate
the expected positive impact of TRP on volumes, and TRP
may enhance a shift towards cheaper drugs that are pro-
duced by prescription quotas. However, interactive mech-
anisms may exceed the intended impact, generating less
equity and possible undertreatment. This effect could be
signalled by a shift from reimbursed to nonreimbursed
drugs.
Materials and methods
Policy impact analysis applied to drugs
Following the aforementioned gaps in the literature, this
paper aims to assess (1) the individual and interactive
effects of the three pharmaceutical policies on public and
private retail drug spending and volumes in the short and
long term, and (2) the causal relationship among policies,
prescription/consumption behaviours and both public and
private expenditures (i.e. the extent to which the long-term
effect on expenditures is mediated by behaviours). Several
models have been used to evaluate policy impact [21, 22].
We employed an enriched difference-in-differences (DD)
model that allows simultaneous estimation of the effects of
three policies and their interactions. We first estimated the
separate effects of policies on public expenditures, private
expenditures and volumes. Then, we tested the hypothesis
that the effects of pharmaceutical policies on public
expenditures are mediated by prescription/consumption
behaviours (i.e. a transmission mechanism). To test for
robustness, we also tested for possible reverse-causality
and feedback mechanisms by switching the mediator and
the independent variable, which allowed us to rule out the
alternative hypothesis of ambiguous causality on
behaviours.
Variables under consideration
Policies considered and their period of activation in every
region are reported in Table 1. Figure 1, on the other hand,
summarised the number of regions in which each policy
was active in every period. Included variables, their mea-
surement and relevant sources are summarised in Table 2.
Dependent variables included monthly per capita public
and private expenditures and volumes for partially and
fully reimbursed as well as nonreimbursed retail drugs.
Volumes were also used as mediators when testing for a
behavioural transmission mechanism. The independent
variable matrix included policies in the short term (i.e.
introduced within 6 months) and long term (i.e. introduced
at least 6 months earlier). We also included a set of control
variables. Public and private expenditures are influenced by
several factors other than policies. For example, in an
investigation on the impact of copayment on drugs in Italy,
Fiorio and Siciliani [5] included control variables and used
a fixed-effects model (using the first-difference approach,
equivalent to a fixed-effects model, since the number of
periods was 2); the authors included a dummy variable for
the regional government (regions may be governed by a
left- or right-leaning coalition), per capita gross domestic
product (GDP), proportion of people[65 years, number of
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pharmacists and number of general practitioners. We
included the same variables (with the exception of phar-
macists and physicians, as the relevant data were
incomplete). Because of possible age-related differences in
drug use, we added the paediatric population; we also
included the political cycle (in pre-election periods, cost-
containment actions may be relaxed to increase consensus)
and added a double control for time: first, we included a
time dummy for every single month (162 variables) in the
model; and second, we controlled for repeated seasonal
effects (Fig. 2) through dummies identifying the quarter
(three variables). These two controls have different
meanings: the second ne captures seasonal trends in the
pharmaceutical market that are repeated every year, par-
ticularly evident from Fig. 2, while the first aims at
reducing endogeneity by capturing any contingent effect
happening in a particular month that is not explicitly
accounted for in our model. In fact, despite the important
seasonal effects, every period can carry some peculiarity
that is outside our model and can influence our dependent
and explanatory variables. However, including monthly
dummies alone would have been enough to explicitly
capture seasonal effects. Moreover, both monthly (unique)
dummies and seasonal (repeated every year) ones are
Table 1 Regional policies
Regions Copayment Prescription quotas Therapeutic reference pricing
Years Months of activation
(number)
Years Months of activation
(number)
Years Months of activation
(number)
Piemonte 2002–2014 151 0 0
Valle d’Aosta 0 2006–2014 104 0
Lombardia 2002–2014 143 0 0
PA Bolzano 2002–2014 149 0 0
PA Trento 0 0 0




Liguria 2002–2014 144 2007–2014 94 2007–2014 94
Emilia
Romagna
2011–2014 38 0 0
Toscana 2012–2014 26 2007–2014 93 0
Umbria 2011–2014 38 0 0
Marche 0 2007–2014 93 0
Lazio 2002–2005,
2008–2014
118 2007–2014 91 0
Abruzzo 2002–2014 149 2005–2014 113 2007–2014 94
Molise 2002–2014 144 2008–2014 73 2007–2014 91
Campania 2007–2014 94 2007–2014 88 2007–2014 88
Puglia 2002–2014 147 0 2007–2014 94
Basilicata 2013–2014 16 2007–2014 90 2007–2014 90
Calabria 2002–2005,
2009–2014
108 2012–2014 32 2007–2014 93
Sicilia 2004–2014 124 2007–2014 91 2007–2014 91
Sardegna 2002–2004 21 2012–2014 31 2007–2014 93
Fig. 1 Number of regions by month and policy (21 regions,
2000–2014). Note: Month 1 is January 2000, and month 180 is
December 2014
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significant and do not present collinearity issues. We fur-
ther considered two other possible sources of endogeneity:
turnaround plans and spillover effects. Since 2007, regions
with important health-care deficits have been asked to
implement a turnaround plan, which increases the pressure
to adopt cost-containment measures. The effects of phar-
maceutical policies would likely be artificially inflated if
turnaround plans were not considered. Accordingly, we
included three dummy variables related to turnaround
plans: (1) whether the region was treated with a turnaround
(R turnaround = 1 if the region has introduced a turn-
around); (2) whether the turnaround was active
(T turnaround = 1 after turnaround plan approval); and (3)
a DD estimator of the turnaround plan’s effect (Turn-
around = 1 if the region was treated and the policy was
active). Second, regions may experience imitative pressure
to adopt drug copayment. This tendency was captured by a
variable that considers, for each month, the overall number
of regions with drug copayments (Fig. 1). Our hypothesis
is that this imitative pressure may strengthen negative and
positive impacts of copayment on public and private
expenditures, respectively, by reducing reaction time from
prescribers and patients who have observed other regions.
We hypothesise that this effect will only influence copay-
ment, as copayment is the policy most discussed and best
known by the population; the other two policies are
Table 2 Variables, measures and sources
Variable Measure Source
Per capita public pharmaceutical
expenditures (ln)
ln of per capita monthly public pharmaceutical expenditures Pharmaceutical observatory,
CERGAS Bocconi
Per capita private pharmaceutical
expenditures (ln)
ln of per capita monthly private pharmaceutical expenditures Pharmaceutical observatory,
CERGAS Bocconi
Per capita volumes of
reimbursed drugs (ln)
ln of per capita monthly volumes (units) sold of reimbursed drugs Pharmaceutical observatory,
CERGAS Bocconi
Per capita volumes of
nonreimbursed drugs (ln)








Region with turnaround plan Dummy variable: 1 if a turnaround plan is active in the region during a
focal month




Total regional monthly income per capita measured in 1000 euros (derived
by a proportion of the annual income)
IISTAT
Share of[65-year-olds Percentage of population[65 years (yearly average) ISTAT
Share of\14 year-olds Percentage of population\14 years (yearly average) ISTAT
Number of regions with
copayment
Number of regions, excluding the focal one, that have already introduced





Dummy variable: 1 if the region has a left-leaning government during a
focal month
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Pre-electoral period Dummy variable: 1 if an election for the regional government occurs within
3 months from the focal month
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Observations 3423
Number of regions and
autonomous provinces
21
In, TRP therapeutic reference pricing; OASI, ISTAT Italian Institute of Statistics, ln (L N - NOT I N ) natural logarithm, OASI osservatorio sulle
aziende e il sistema sanitario italiano, CERGAS centro di ricerca sulla gestione dell’assistenza sanitaria e sociale
Fig. 2 Monthly public and private pharmaceutical expenditures in
Italy (2000–2014)—euros per capita. Month 1 is January 2000, and
month 180 is December 2014. The three vertical lines show the first
month in which copayment, prescription quotas and therapeutic
reference pricing (TRP), respectively, from left to right, were first
introduced
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primarily known by technical staff, making spillover
effects less likely. We also tested a model with spillover
effects on the other two policies, but their coefficients were
never significant, so we removed them to create the most
parsimonious models.
The model
A DD model was adopted and enriched to better address the
parallel trend assumption (i.e. in the absence of the policy,
dependent variables would vary similarly over time in both
the treatment and control groups). In addition to standard
procedures for estimating a DD effect, we adopted two
strategies to better cope with the assumption. First, we
controlled for the simultaneous presence of more than one
policy at any time in every region, with the inclusion of
interactions. Second, we included the difference between
short- and long-term effects. This way of addressing the
parallel trend assumption does not remove it but allows a
more precise estimation of such a trend. The consequence of
this strategy can be seen in the different R and T coefficients
(see below) for copayment after inclusion of the other two
policies. The model is described by the following equation:
yjt ¼ b0 þ Rjb1 þ Ttb2 þ b3Djt þ Runjtb4
þ b5Interactionsjt þ Xjtb6 þ ujt; ð1Þ
where Rj = 1 if the region belongs to the treatment group,
i.e. to the group of regions that have activated the policy
for at least 1 month over the observed range; Tt = 1 in the
treatment period (Tt = 0 before t,, the month when first the
region introduces the focal policy); Djt indicates that region
j is on treatment at time t, i.e. region j belongs to the R = 1
group, t C t and the policy has been introduced in region j;
b3 is the main parameter of interest (DD); Runjt is a pair of
dummy variables that indicates whether the focal policy
has been applied for \6 months or for at least 6 months
(we tested different definitions of long term, finding con-
sistent results and an indication that most differences
between short- and long-term effects are visible using the
6-months split tables available from the authors);
Interactionsjt is the set of interactions among difference-in-
differences in the three policies; and Xjt is the control
variable matrix, including both quarterly (seasonal) dum-
mies repeated every year and 162 monthly dummies.
The behavioural mediation hypothesis was tested with the
Sobel–Goodman test and completed by a bootstrap estima-
tion. The Sobel test, also known as the delta method, was
introduced in 1982 [23] as a test of the significance of the
indirect (mediated) effect. If a is the path from the inde-
pendent variable and the mediator, and b is the path from the
mediator to the dependent variable, then a 9 b is the indi-
rect effect. After dividing the indirect effect by the square
root of the variance b2 9 standard error of
a ? a2 9 standard error of b, a Z test is made on this ratio.
When its value is[1.96, the mediation hypothesis is sup-
ported. However, MacKinnon et al. [24] provided evidence
of the conservative nature of the Sobel test, which is,
therefore, not very powerful. The main reason for the test
being conservative is that the sampling distribution of the
indirect effect is highly skewed. When the patter is positive,
there is positive skew with many small estimates of the
indirect effect and few very large ones. Since the Sobel test
uses a normal approximation that presumes a symmetric
distribution, it falsely presumes symmetry, which leads to a
conservative test. For this reason, the Sobel test is generally
associated with bootstrapping [25, 26], a nonparametric
method based on resampling with replacement, which is
done many times (1000 in this study), where the indirect
effect is estimated at every replication. We estimated the
indirect effect (and direct and total effects) using both the
standard Sobel–Goodman test and the bootstrap method.
To consider possible simultaneous effects on private
expenditures and volumes, we tested two mediation
mechanisms. In other words, we allowed only volumes or
private expenditures to react to policies in each model so
we could establish their individual impacts. In particular, in
the first model, we used public expenditures as the
dependent variable, policies as independent variables and
volumes as a mediator that was conditioned on all other
control variables and private expenditures. In the second
model, we used private expenditures as a mediator that was
conditioned on all other control variables and volumes.
Results
Figure 1 shows the number of regions that adopted each
policy over the observed period (178 months), and monthly
public and private expenditures are presented in Fig. 2 (a
seasonal trend is evident). Copayment was introduced for
the first time at month 24 (January 2002). At the end of the
period (December 2010), copayment was present in 12
regions. Prescription quotas were first adopted at month 66
(May 2005) and were eventually implemented by nine
regions. TRP was introduced by three regions at month 85
(January 2007) and eventually adopted by six other
regions. Regions were not allowed to introduce TRP after
January 2008, but regions in which the policy had already
been introduced were allowed to maintain it.
DD models for individual and interactive effects
Descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 3. Box 1
illustrates the model matrix. Results are illustrated in
Table 4a (expenditures models) and Table 4b (volumes
models). Box 1 illustrates the model matrix (Table 3).
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Effects on public expenditures
Copayment (model 3) directly reduced public expenditures
by 6 % in the short term and 4.6 % (6 % in the short
term ? 1.4 % after the first 6 months) in the long term.
When prescription quotas were also activated, the negative
impact of copayment increased by 4.9 %, while the inter-
action between copayment and TRP was not significant.
Interestingly, TRP had no effect in the short term, while after
the first 6 months, its presence increased public expenditures
by 3.7 %. As expected, prescription quotas showed their
direct effect on public expenditures in the long term
(-1.8 %), as their mechanism of transmission is thought to
be primarily behavioural and is not thought to be mediated by
elasticity effects. However, the interaction between pre-
scription quotas and TRP is positive, leading to a further
increase in public expenditures due to TRP (?1.9 %).
Effects on volumes
Volumes of reimbursed drugs (model 9) were affected by
copayments in a similar but smoother manner compared
with public expenditures, with a 1.8 % short-term
decrease and a 0.9 % long-term decrease (-1.8 % in the
short term ? 0.9 % after the first 6 months); however, the
long-term effect was not significant. The interaction of
copayment and prescription quotas contributed to an
additional 4.6 % decline in volumes. The interaction
between copayment and TRP was significant and negative
also, with an additional effect of -3.2 %. These reduc-
tions are partly compensated for by the fact that the
individual effect of prescription quotas and TRP were
positive (?2.2 and ?2.5 %, respectively, with TRP also
increasing it effects in the long run by an additional
3.4 %). In other words, when not coupled with a copay-
ment, the other two policies cause an increase in volumes;
however, when copayment is active, their impact is
reduced (TRP) or even reversed (prescription quotas).
Interestingly, TRP is also associated with an increase in
consumption of nonreimbursed drugs (?5.5 if cost shar-
ing is not active, ?1.9 % otherwise; model 12). If perfect
substitution among products within the same therapeutic
class is assumed, TRP represents a perceived reduction in
prices for prescribers and patients and should increase
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Max Min
Per capita public pharmaceutical expenditures (€) 15.63 3.02 28.10 7.48
Per capita private pharmaceutical expenditures (€) 9.73 2.38 20.11 2.32
Per capita volumes of reimbursed drugs (units) 1.57 0.28 3.15 0.83
Per capita volumes of nonreimbursed drugs (U) 0.85 0.17 1.43 0.50
Per capita public pharmaceutical expenditures 2.73 0.20 3.34 2.01
Per capita private pharmaceutical expenditures (ln) 2.24 0.26 3.00 0.84
Per capita volumes of reimbursed drugs (ln) 0.43 0.18 1.15 -0.19
Per capita volumes of nonreimbursed drugs (ln) -0.18 0.20 0.36 -0.70
Copayment 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00
Prescription quotas 0.28 0.45 1.00 0.00
TRP 0.24 0.43 1.00 0.00
Turnaround 0.21 0.40 1.00 0.00
Average monthly income (91000 euros) 2.06 0.52 3.22 1.12
Share of[65 years 12.41 9.21 26.00 0.15
Share of\14 years 8.53 6.32 18.75 0.11
Number of regions with copayment 10.54 4.06 16.00 0.00
Left-leaning regional government 0.57 0.49 1.00 0.00
Pre-electoral period 0.05 0.22 1.00 0.00
TRP therapeutic reference pricing, In
Box 1 Model matrix
Copayment only Copayment ? control variables All three policies ? control variables
Table 4a (expenditures) Models 1 and 4 Models 2 and 5 Models 3 and 6
Table 4b (volumes) Models 7 and 10 Models 8 and 11 Models 9 and 12
The two models in each cell refer to public and private drug expenditures and volumes of partially or fully reimbursed and nonreimbursed drugs
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volumes. The increase in volumes of nonreimbursed drugs
by 5.5 %, may have been the result of a perception of
substitutability of products under TRP. This also signals
that private expenditures might be endogenous to TRP,
and—as confirmed by mediation analysis—where private
expenditures will be explicitly controlled for.
Effects on patient expenditures
Dynamics of public expenditures and the contemporaneous
impact on volumes help explain the effect of the three
policies on private expenditures (model 6). First, the short-
term effect of copayment on private expenditure (?9 %)
mirrors the decrease in public expenditures (-6 %, model
3). To evaluate the meaning of the two effects in absolute
terms, these two difference-in-differences coefficients were
applied to the average prepolicy levels of expenditures
reported by treated regions. In absolute terms, applying
estimated coefficients to the average prepolicy level of
expenditures, the estimated decrease in public expenditures
is 1.05 euros per capita/month, while the increase in private
expenditures is 0.64 euros per capita/month: the difference
of 0.41 euros per capita/month is due to reduced volumes
(-1.8 %). The opposite long-term effect of cost sharing on
public expenditures is reflected in a similar increase in
private expenditures, even though the coefficient is not
significant. Second, while prescription quotas have no
effects on public expenditures in the short term, since the
impact on volumes is positive, the effect on patient
expenditure is also positive (?6.1 %). Therefore, pre-
scription quotas increase the consumption of reimbursed
drugs rather than creating a simple reallocation of pre-
scriptions on different products; however, expenditures
increases for patients only, signalling that physicians tend
to prescribe such drugs without activating public reim-
bursement (patients can privately buy reimbursement drugs
with a prescription written by a physician on a signed paper
and not on the official prescription document). Figure 3
summarises the effects.
Some control variables also had an influence on drugs
expenditures. For example, regions with larger proportions
of elderly and young patients showed a higher level of
public expenditures, while patient expenditure was higher
in regions with older populations and lower in regions with
younger ones. Volumes of reimbursed drugs were lower in
regions with larger young populations, while both the
young and the elderly tended to consume fewer nonreim-
bursed drugs. Income was negatively correlated with both
public and private expenditures and with volumes of
reimbursed drugs. This effect contradicts the expectation
Fig. 3 Simultaneous impact of pharmaceutical policies over time on
public expenditures (a), private expenditures (b), units of (partially
and fully) reimbursed drugs (c), and units of nonreimbursable drugs
(d). Initial levels are set to 100. Simulations were performed using
models 3, 6, 9 and 12
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Table 4 Models on ln of (a) expenditures, (b) volumes (sold units)














Copayment -0.136*** -0.069*** -0.060*** 0.103*** 0.079*** 0.090***
Copayment ([6 m) -0.060*** 0.011* 0.014** 0.135*** -0.017* -0.016
Prescription quotas 0.001 0.061***
Prescription quotas ([6 m) -0.018** 0.003
TRP -0.013 0.024




Copayment 9 TRP 0.007 -0.040***
Prescription quotas 9 TRP 0.019** -0.021*
R (copayment) 0.205*** -0.038 0.014 -0.149 -0.029 0.039
R (prescription quotas) 0.092 0.032
R (TRP) -0.307*** -0.425***
T (copayment) 0.004 0.230 0.350* 0.193*** 0.140 0.207
T (prescription quotas) -0.126*** -0.080
T (TRP) 0.191 0.238
Region with turnaround plan -0.022*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015**
R (turnaround) 0.043 0.180*** -0.157** 0.098**
T (turnaround) 0.191 – 0.122
Average monthly income
(91000)
-0.313*** -0.336*** -0.195*** -0.176***
Share of[65 year 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.015***
Share of\14 year 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.033*** -0.025***
Number of regions with
copayment
-0.017 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001
Left-leaning regional
government
-0.000 0.002 -0.035*** -0.028***
Pre-electoral period -0.005 -0.005 0.009 0.010
Monthly and quarterly dummy
variables
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant 2.657*** 3.105*** 3.106*** 2.069*** 2.740*** 2.515***
Observations 3486 3423 3423 3486 3423 3423
Number of regions 21 21 21 21 21 21
R2 (overall) 0.104 0.662 0.753 0.160 0.416 0.674
R2 (within) 0.191 0.869 0.875 0.285 0.833 0.842
R2 (between) 0.038 0.511 0.633 0.009 0.032 0.368
v2 814.1 21,242 22,583 1377 15,907 17,030
p value (v2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Class-A units Class-A units Class-A units Other classes Other classes Other classes
(b)
Co-payment -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.018*** -0.009 -0.002 0.007
Co-payment ([6 m) 0.169*** 0.004 0.009 -0.076*** -0.001 -0.002
Prescription quotas 0.022*** 0.004
Prescription quotas ([6 m) -0.005 0.002
TRP 0.025** 0.055***
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that the most affluent patients may be more willing to shift
from public to private expenditures [18], and in the case of
exemptions based on income, they are obliged to contribute
more. However, because of copayments, patients not eli-
gible for exemptions (i.e. the most affluent) must also pay
for reimbursed drugs, which creates less demand and,
consequently, a lower level of public and private expen-
ditures. The same phenomenon has been reported by the
Italian Department of Health with respect to specialist
visits, where patients without exemptions reduced their
demand after activation of cost-sharing, as opposed to
patients with exemptions based on income, whose demand
remained stable.
Turnaround plans appear to be an important control
variable. Regions with such plans include those spending
more for drugs and experiencing the highest decrease in
public and private drug expenditures. As expected, private
drug expenditures in regions governed by left-leaning
coalitions were lower than regions governed by right-
leaning coalitions. In fact, left-leaning coalitions appeared
to be more sensitive to social issues and public coverage
(volumes of reimbursed drugs are higher in these regions).
The political cycle had no important influence on drug
expenditures.
Test of a mediation by behavioural mechanisms
Copayment is the only policy in which its relationship with
public expenditures is mediated by both volume and pri-
vate expenditure. Prescription quotas and TRP may involve
transmission mechanisms other than volume, such as
change in mix of prescribed drugs, but these data were not
Table 4 continued
Variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Class-A units Class-A units Class-A units Other classes Other classes Other classes
TRP ([6 m) 0.034*** 0.016*
Co-payment 9 Prescription quotas -0.046*** 0.005
Co-payment 9 TRP -0.032*** -0.036***
Prescription quotas 9 TRP 0.014* -0.003
R (co-payment) 0.003 0.016 0.056 -0.040 -0.050 -0.004
R (prescription quotas) 0.097*** 0.055
R (TRP) -0.196*** -0.279***
T (co-payment) -0.001 -0.195 -0.219 -0.152*** 0.152 0.462***
T (prescription quotas) -0.002 -0.321***
T (TRP) 0.007 0.199*
Region with turnaround plan -0.006 -0.000 0.002 -0.007*
R (turnaround) 0.019 0.096** -0.058 0.099**
T (turnaround) 0.014 – 0.125
Average monthly income (91000) -0.183*** -0.171*** 0.005 0.029
Share of[65 year 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002*
Share of\14 year -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.011***
Number of regions with co-payment 0.022 0.024 -0.046*** -0.046***
Left-leaning regional government 0.001 0.008** 0.001 0.007**
Pre-electoral period -0.001 -0.000 -0.008* -0.008*
Monthly and quaterly dummy variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant 0.365*** 0.817*** 0.727*** 0.049 0.276*** 0.108
Observations 3234 3171 3171 3234 3171 3171
Number of regions 21 21 21 21 21 21
R2 (overall) 0.030 0.663 0.748 0.049 0.442 0.642
R2 (within) 0.105 0.863 0.871 0.066 0.845 0.854
R2 (between) 0.001 0.397 0.568 0.041 0.227 0.521
v2 370.4 18,755 20,043 228.7 16,256 17,232
p value (v2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Class-A stands for reimbursable drugs
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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available. Results of mediation tests are presented in
Table 5, and details are provided in Table 6.
The first copayment mediation model , with drug vol-
umes as the mediator, supports the mediation hypothesis.
By holding private expenditures constant, copayment
reduces volumes by 5.4 %. The elasticity of public
expenditures to volumes is 0.81, such that a 5.4 % reduc-
tion in volumes produces a 4.4 % decline in public
spending. Therefore, the direct impact of copayment
(-3 %) is reinforced by the indirect effect, and the total
effect of -7.4 % is partly mediated (59.7 % of the total
effect) by a volume effect. We also assessed the amount of
burden transferred to patients by holding volumes constant,
thus observing the mediation of private expenditures. The
total effect of copayment on public expenditures was
reduced from 7.4 to 4.1 % when volumes were held con-
stant, whereas the direct effect did not change (-2.9 %). In
this case, copayment produced a 7.5 % increase in private
expenditures, and the elasticity of substitution between
private and public expenditures was -0.14. Therefore, the
indirect effect of copayment via private expenditures was
-1.1 %, mediating 26.5 % of the total effect on public
expenditures. No mediation was observed in the long term,
so we removed the long-term effect from Table 5. Com-
paring the two tests on copayment, we provide evidence
that a behavioural volume effect attenuated the burden of a
shift from public to private coverage. The effects of pre-
scription quotas were not mediated by private expenditures.
However, the effects of prescription quotas were fully
mediated by volumes, creating an increase of 2.5 %. Such
an increase led to a ?2.0 % indirect effect of prescription
quotas on public expenditures. Finally, the effect of TRP
was only mediated by volumes in the long run. Differently
from what emerged from regression analysis, when holding
private expenditures constant, the impact of TRP on vol-
umes was negative rather than positive. In fact, controlling
for private expenditures, TRP produced a decrease in
volumes of 2.7 %, which translates into a 2.2 % reduction
in public expenditures. The direct effect, instead, remained
positive (3.7 %), and therefore the total effect was not
significantly different from 0. This situation is known as
inconsistent mediation, because the direct effect has an
opposite sign compared with the indirect effect, resulting in
a null total effect. In other words, the mediated effect
compensates for the direct one. Bootstrap estimations were
consistent and confirmed the Sobel–Goodman test results
(Table 6). All reverse causality tests rejected mediation at
the 95 % confidence level.
Discussion
This paper discusses the effects of pharmaceutical policies,
simultaneously and variously implemented, on retail drug
expenses and volumes and considers possible behavioural
transmission mechanisms. These two topics have not been
previously investigated.
Italy is the ideal country for assessing the simultaneous
effects of policies, as policies have been applied in dif-
ferent regions at different times. Italy’s regional copayment
is unique within the EU, but in most countries, prescribing
policies (clinical governance and prescription targets) are
implemented at regional and local levels. Hence, this
analysis can be largely extended to other countries. The
model was designed to:
(1) Estimate the simultaneous impact of different
policies in the short and long term.



















Cost sharing Volumes Yes 59.7 % -3.0 % -4.4 % -7.4 % \0.01
Private
expenditures





161.0 % NS 2.0 % NS \0.05
Private
expenditures
No 35.5 % NS NS NS [0.05




Yes -152.2 % 3.6 % -2.2 % NS \0.01
Private
expenditures
No NS NS NS NS [0.1
TRP therapeutic reference pricing, NS not significant
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Table 6 Results of the Sobel–Goodman test and bootstrap analysis
Effects Coefficient Standard error Z Significance Bootstrap coefficient
DV: public expentitures; IV: cost sharing; MV: volumes
Sobel -0.044 0.007 -6.453 ***
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.044 0.007 -6.452 ***
Goodman-2 -0.044 0.007 -6.454 ***
a coefficient -0.055 0.008 -6.495 ***
b coefficient 0.810 0.014 56.677 ***
Indirect effect -0.044 0.007 -6.453 *** -0.044
Direct effect -0.030 0.007 -4.504 *** -0.030
Total effect -0.074 0.010 -7.823 *** -0.074
Proportion of total effect mediated 59.7 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect 1.482
Ratio of total to direct effect 2.482
DV: public expentitures; IV: cost sharing; MV: private expenditures
Sobel -0.011 0.002 -5.342 ***
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.011 0.002 -5.333 ***
Goodman-2 -0.011 0.002 -5.352 ***
Coefficienta 0.076 0.013 5.679 ***
Coefficientb -0.143 0.009 -15.742 ***
Indirect effect -0.011 0.002 -5.342 *** -0.011
Direct effect -0.030 0.007 -4.504 *** -0.030
Total effect -0.041 0.007 -5.922 *** -0.041
Proportion of total effect mediated 26.5 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect 0.360
Ratio of total to direct effect 1.360
DV: public expentitures; IV: prescription quotas; MV: volumes
Sobel 0.020 0.009 2.231 **
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.020 0.009 2.23 **
Goodman-2 0.020 0.009 2.231 **
Coefficienta 0.025 0.011 2.232 **
Coefficientb 0.810 0.014 56.677 ***
Indirect effect 0.020 0.009 2.231 ** 0.020
Direct effect -0.008 0.009 -0.874 -0.008
Total effect 0.012 0.012 0.997 0.012
Proportion of total effect mediated 161.0 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect -2.639
Ratio of total to direct effect -1.639
DV: public expentitures; IV: prescription quotas; MV: private expenditures
Sobel -0.004 0.002 -1.665 *
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.004 0.002 -1.661 *
Goodman-2 -0.004 0.002 -1.668 *
Coefficienta 0.029 0.017 1.674 *
Coefficientb -0.143 0.009 -15.742 ***
Indirect effect -0.004 0.002 -1.665 * -0.004
Direct effect -0.008 0.009 -0.874 -0.008
Total effect -0.012 0.009 -1.303 -0.012
Proportion of total effect mediated 35.5 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect 0.550
Ratio of total to direct effect 1.550
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(2) Control for the simultaneous presence of other
policies, thus addressing the parallel trend problem.
(3) Incorporate and model endogeneity issues, such as
turnaround plans and possible spillover effects.
(4) Assess the direct and indirect (or mediated) impact
of policies.
The first interesting result of our study is that combined
policies do not necessarily produce a higher impact than
individual policies. For example, when copayment and
prescription quotas are combined, the final impact is higher
than in the case of each policy being implemented inde-
pendently; the impact of a combination of former policies
with TRP is counterintuitive instead; Second, we generally
observed a larger impact of policies in the short term, as the
trend was often reversed in the long term, although not
sufficiently to compensate the final impact, which was
Table 6 continued
Effects Coefficient Standard error Z Significance Bootstrap coefficient
DV: public expentitures; IV: TRP; MV: volumes
Sobel -0.020 0.012 -1.769 *
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.020 0.012 -1.769 *
Goodman-2 -0.020 0.012 -1.769 *
Coefficienta -0.025 0.014 -1.770 *
Coefficientb 0.810 0.014 56.677 ***
Indirect effect -0.020 0.012 -1.769 * -0.020
Direct effect 0.010 0.011 0.905 0.010
Total effect -0.010 0.016 -0.643 -0.010
Proportion of total effectmediated 197.9 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect -2.021
Ratio of total to direct effect -1.021
DV: public expentitures; IV: TRP (long run); MV: volumes
Sobel -0.022 0.007 -3.241 ***
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.022 0.007 -3.241 ***
Goodman-2 -0.022 0.007 -3.242 ***
Coefficienta -0.027 0.008 -3.246 ***
Coefficientb 0.810 0.014 56.679 ***
Indirect effect -0.022 0.007 -3.241 *** -0.022
Direct effect 0.036 0.007 5.556 *** 0.036
Total effect 0.014 0.009 1.534 0.014
Proportion of total effect mediated -152.2 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect -0.604
Ratio of total to direct effect 0.396
DV: public expentitures; IV: TRP; MV: private expenditures
Sobel -0.003 0.003 -0.902
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.003 0.003 -0.9
Goodman-2 -0.003 0.003 -0.904
Coefficienta 0.020 0.022 0.904
Coefficientb -0.143 0.009 -15.742 ***
Indirect effect -0.003 0.003 -0.902 -0.003
Direct effect 0.010 0.011 0.905 0.010
Total effect 0.007 0.012 0.621 0.007
Proportion of total effect mediated -40.2 %
Ratio of indirect to direct effect -0.287
Ratio of total to direct effect 0.713
DV dependent variable, IV independent variable, MV mediator variable, TRP therapeutic reference pricing
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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usually in the expected direction. Third, analysis of medi-
ation shows that the negative impact of copayment on
public expenditures is primarily caused by volumes,
whereas the shift from public to private expenditures is less
important. The demand for prescription-only drugs appears
to be price-elastic. The TRP transmission mechanism is
driven by an expenditure shift in the short term and by
volumes in the long term, with a final unpredicted impact
on public expenditures that increases instead of being
controlled.
This study has some limitations. First, we used aggre-
gate data to estimate the simultaneous effects of the poli-
cies. Some policies are disease specific (e.g. prescription
quotas and TRP), and their effects would have been better
captured by more granular data. Further research is needed
on this topic, but the scope of this study was intentionally
broad. Second, we assumed that copayment was equal
across regions, but Fiorio and Siciliani [5] have shown that
the effect of copayment also depends on fee per prescrip-
tion. In this study we provide an average effect of copay-
ment. We acknowledge that it may vary in size (but not in
direction) according to the different fees per prescription.
Finally, we were unable to fully disentangle prescription
and consumption, as we only observed expenditures for
drugs that were prescribed and sold. In other words, even
though we observed changes in volumes due to a joint
decision of patient and general practitioner, we could not
shed more light on the agency relationship between the two
actors, e.g. when a drug is prescribed by the practitioner
but not bought by the patient.
Conclusions
Evidence regarding the impact over time of regional poli-
cies diversely introduced at different times have important
policy implications. First, pharmaceutical policies interact
with each other, and the combined effect may be different
from what would be expected from the sum of each indi-
vidual policy. Hence, policymakers should be very careful
when designing mixed policies due to their unexpected
combined effects. Second, the impact of policies tends to
reduce over time. If longer-term impact is desired, it would
be appropriate to introduce some changes over time (e.g.
increasing copayment or reducing exemption from copay-
ment). Third, policies have multiple effects that should be
considered when they are designed. For example copay-
ments may be intended to reduce volumes, because they
are considered inappropriate, and/or to partially shift the
burden of drug expenditures from third-party payers to
patients. Our analysis shows that the impact on volumes is
more important than a coverage shift in decreasing public
drug expenditure. Finally, pharmaceutical policies may
have an unintended impact on health and health care.
Copayment is applied where per capita drug volumes are
low. If lower volumes are associated with appropriate drug
usage, a further decrease in volumes may imply
undertreatment, with an important impact on health and
health expenditures. However, because many drugs anal-
ysed in this study are prescribed by general practitioners
for chronic diseases (e.g. hypertension, diabetes, hyperc-
holesterolaemia), undertreatment has a long-term impact
on health and health-care expenditures, a time frame that
tends not to be considered by payers.
Hence, despite its limitations, this study contributes to
research and policy-making decisions by presenting a
detailed and behavioural perspective on policy impacts, as
we adopted a multifaceted (patients, prescribers, policy-
makers) perspective regarding pharmaceutical policies.
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